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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J. R. SCARTH, 
Petitioner and 
Appellee, 
v. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Drivers License 
Division for the State of 
Utah, 
Respondent and 
Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court improperly credit the time Petitioner's 
driving privileges were temporarily reinstated pending trial 
toward his 120-day suspension? 
This is a question of law and the Court should accord no 
deference to the district court judgment and should review the 
matter on a "correctness" standard. State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 
1150, 1161 (Utah 1991); Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 
(Utah 1991). 
* 
* BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
* Civil No. 920580-CA 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7) (1988): 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this 
subsection is for a period of 120 days, beginning on 
the 31st day after arrest. 
The statute has been recently amended, effective April 27, 1992, 
to require a one-year suspension for second and subsequent 
suspension. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (7) (b) (Cum. Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
This appeal is from a portion of the final judgment and 
decree of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, the 
Honorable Don B. Tibbs presiding, involving the judicial review 
of an informal adjudicative proceeding of the Drivers License 
Division. 
Petitioner sought judicial resview of the administrative 
action of the respondent suspending Petitioner's driving 
privileges for a period of 120 days, commencing March 11, 1992, 
for driving or being in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a breath alcohol content above .08%. 
Verified Petition for Reinstatement of Drivers License, R. at 40. 
On April 20, 1992 Petitioner obtained an ex parte order 
reinstating his driving privileges pending judicial review. 
Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and drivers 
2 
license, R. at 38. After the June 25, 1992 hearing on judicial 
review, the trial court affirmed the 120-day suspension and 
immediately vacated its temporary order. However, the trial 
court included as part of the suspension period the time from 
April 20, 1992 through June 25, 1992, the time when the trial 
court had reinstated the Petitioner's driving privileges pending 
trial. See Order Affirming Suspension of Petitioner's Driving 
Privileges for a Period of 120 Days, Addendum Item B,R. at 5. 
Respondent has appealed that portion of the Order, claiming that 
the Petitioner is required by law to serve 120 days of actual 
suspension. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner is required to serve a period of 120 days of 
suspension of his driving privileges for driving or being in the 
actual physical control of the motor vehicle while having a 
breath alcohol content above .08%, since this was his second 
suspension within five years. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7) 
(1988). Pending trial in the district court, the Petitioner 
obtained temporary relief that reinstated his driving privileges, 
but that should not allow him substantive relief from the 120-day 
statutory suspension period. The court should not allow the days 
when the Petitioner's driving privileges were reinstated to count 
toward the 120 days of suspension. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CREDITED TOWARD 
PETITIONER'S 120-DAY SUSPENSION THE DAYS WHEN HIS 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES WERE REINSTATED PENDING TRIAL. 
The Petitioner's driving privileges were suspended by 
the Respondent pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (1988), for 
the reason that Petitioner had driven or been in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a breath alcohol content 
above .08 percent. Since this was his second suspension, the 
suspension period was 120 days. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(7) 
(1988). Petitioner sought judicial review of the Suspension 
Order by way of a trial de novo in District Court. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-131(1) (Supp. 1991). 
As an action seeking to review the administrative order 
of the Respondent, this action was governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-0.5 
et seq. (Supp. 1992). Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 
(Utah App. 1990). After filing the Petition, the Petitioner 
obtained an ex parte order entitled "Temporary Order Reinstating 
Driving Privileges and Driver's License," directing the 
Respondent to restore and return Petitioner's driving privileges 
to him "pending final determination in this cause." R. at 38 
Respondent objected immediately to the ex parte proceedings and 
the order. R. at 20. 
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After the hearing on the merits of judicial review, the 
trial court indicated that it was ruling in favor of the 
Respondent Driver's License Division, affirming Petitioner's 
suspension, and immediately vacated the temporary order 
reinstating the driving privileges. Most important to this 
appeal, the trial court then directed that the suspension period 
would be 120 days commencing the 31st day after the arrest, and 
the suspension period would include the period when the trial 
court had reinstated and "stayed" the suspension order by the 
Respondent. R. 5, Order Affirming Suspension (Addendum Item B). 
Respondent here contends that the trial court erred in counting 
the period of time that Petitioner retained his license under the 
temporary order towards the 120-day period of suspension. 
The Uniform Operator License Act, Utah Code Ann. §41-
2-130(7) (1988), provides that: 
(7) A second or subsequent suspension under 
this section is for a period of one hundred 
twenty (120) days, beginning on the 31st day 
after the date of arrest. 
The plain meaning of the statute is that the Petitioner should be 
required to serve a 120-day period of "suspension." "Suspension" 
is defined as: 
the temporary withdrawal by action of the 
division of a licensee's privilege to operate 
a motor vehicle. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-102(28) (Supp. 1992). Thus, the period 
when his driving privileges were reinstated by the temporary 
court order should not count toward that period of suspension nor 
should he be entitled to credit for those days he was allowed to 
drive, as during that time he was not under "suspension." 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the court 
is authorized, in certain instances, to "grant a stay or other 
temporary remedy," pending judicial review. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-18 (Supp. 1992). Although not denominated as such, the 
temporary order granting the Petitioner driving privileges 
pending judicial review must be considered a "stay or other 
temporary remedy" pursuant to that section. A properly obtained 
stay should not grant, nor be allowed to grant, substantive 
relief from the administrative order, but should merely suspend 
enforcement of that order pending judicial review. See Reed v. 
Rhodes, 472 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D.C. Ohio 1979). When a court 
subsequently vacates the stay, the original order should be 
enforceable. 
In this case, the trial court allowed the time when the 
Petitioner's driving privileges were temporarily returned to him 
pending trial to be counted toward his period of suspension. 
This was improper, as it allows the temporary order to grant 
substantive relief to the Petitioner, thereby shortening the 
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period of suspension by 66 days. The trial court should have 
entered its order affirming the suspension of the driving 
privileges of the Petitioner for a period of 120 days from the 
date of its order, allowing as a credit toward the period of 
suspension only the time spent on actual suspension, here 54 
days. The Petitioner should be required to spend the statutory 
period of 120 days with his driving privileges suspended and not 
be allowed to drive for any of those 120 days. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
reverse that portion of the Order of the district court giving 
credit toward the period of suspension when Petitioner's driving 
privileges were reinstated and direct the district court to order 
that the Petitioner's driving privileges be suspended for a 
period of 120 days commencing upon entry of the district court's 
new order, giving credit only for the number of days the 
Petitioner had previously spent on actual suspension. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of 
1993. 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed two 
true and correct copies, of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
the following this \ ^ day of -^J &.CA.S/«./^ , 
1993: 
J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Petitioner 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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ADDENDUM A 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS (2773) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR KANE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. SCARTH, * 
Petitioner, * 
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau * 
Chief, Drivers License * Civil No. 920600020 
Division for the State of * 
Utah, * Judge Don V. Tibbs 
Respondent. * 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing on Thursday, June 25, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
District Court Judge, presiding, Petitioner appearing in person 
and representing himself, and the Respondent appearing through 
counsel, Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the 
proceedings being held in the District Court in and for Sevier 
County, by prior agreement and stipulation of the parties, and 
the Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties, 
arguments on their behalf, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That shortly after midnight on February 10, 1992, 
the Petitioner was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
in Kanab City, Kane County, State of Utah. 
2. That at that time, the vehicle was apparently "hung 
up" and stuck in a ditch at the side of the road, that the car 
lights were on, the engine running, the transmission engaged, and 
the rear wheels spinning. The Petitioner was in the driver's 
seat and was in control of the vehicle. 
3. That Officer Doug Crosby of the Kanab City Police 
approached the vehicle because the car and/or driver appeared to 
be in difficulty and to ascertain the nature of the problem. 
4. Upon approaching the vehicle and making contact 
with the Petitioner, the officer noticed an odor of alcohol and 
other indications of intoxication and asked the Petitioner if he 
would perform some field sobriety tests. The Petitioner agreed 
and performed and/or attempted to perform the field sobriety 
tests, generally in an unsatisfactory manner. 
5. Based upon the officer's observations of the 
Petitioner, he reasonably concluded and had probable cause to 
believe and believed that the Petitioner had been driving or was 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of 
safely operating a motor vehicle, and therefore placed the 
Petitioner under arrest for driving under the influence. 
6. That after placing Petitioner under arrest, the 
officer reasonably requested that the Petitioner submit to a 
breath test, which the Petitioner agreed to perform. 
7. That for a period in excess of 15 minutes prior to 
the breath test, the officer had the Petitioner under constant 
observation, and for that period of time Petitioner consumed no 
food or drink or otherwise put or had anything in his mouth. 
8. That the officer properly operated the machine, 
following the approved operational checklist and complied with 
all matters pursuant to his training to insure a proper test 
result. 
9. That the calibration and testing for the accuracy 
of the intoxilyzer were performed in accordance with the 
standards established by the Commissioner of Public Safety, and 
that the affidavits regarding the machine were prepared in the 
regular course of the public officer's duty, that they were 
prepared contemporaneous with the act, condition or event 
described therein, and that the source of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were 
such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
10. That the results of the intoxilyzer on the 
Petitioner accurately reflected his breath alcohol content. 
11. That the intoxilyzer results and the breath 
alcohol concentration of the Petitioner were .17 percent. 
12. That the officer, after filling out the paperwork, 
personally served upon the Petitioner a DUI summons and citation 
and the notice, on behalf of the Driver License Division, of the 
Division's intent to suspend the driving privileges of the 
Petitioner. 
13. At the time of officer's initial observance of the 
Petitioner in the vehicle, the Petitioner was under the influence 
of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely 
operating a motor vehicle. 
The Court, having heretofore made and entered its 
Findings of Fact, now hereby makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Petitioner was lawfully arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
2. That the driving privileges of the Petitioner were 
subject to suspension based upon his driving or being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely 
operating a motor vehicle, and based upon his driving or being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol 
content in excess of .08 percent. 
3. That this Court should enter an order affirming the 
suspension of the driving privileges of the Petitioner for a 
period of 120 days, and make its own order to such an effect. 
DATED this 3 day of M 0 6>U ST . 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DON V/. TIBBS 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
\L^£. SCARTH 
Petitioner Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following this (y^ day of 
sM 1992: 
J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Petitioner 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
ADDENDUM B 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS (2773) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR KANE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. SCARTH, * 
Petitionee * 
* ORDER AFFIRMING SUSPENSION OF 
vs. * PETITIONERS DRIVING 
* PRIVILEGES FOR A PERIOD OF 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau * 120 DAYS 
Chief, Drivers License * 
Division for the State of * 
Utah, * Civil No. 920600020 
Respondent. * 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing on Thursday, June 25, 1992, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
District Court Judge, presiding, Petitioner appearing in person 
and representing himself, and the Respondent appearing through 
counsel, Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the 
proceedings being held in the District Court in and for Sevier 
County, by prior agreement and stipulation of the parties, and 
the Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties, 
arguments on their behalf, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and the Court having previously entered the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised in the 
premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of the 
Respondent suspending the driving privileges of the Petitioner 
for a period of 120 days, commencing March 11, 1992, shall be and 
is hereby affirmed; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the previously 
entered Temporary Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and 
Drivers License was vacated at the conclusion of the hearing in 
this case on June 25, 1992, and is of no further force and 
effect; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the period during 
which the order of suspension by the Respondent was stayed and of 
no force and effect pursuant to the above-mentioned Temporary 
Order Reinstating Driving Privileges and Drivers License, 
consisting of the period from April 20, 1992 up to and including 
June 25, 1992, does not alter or effect the period of suspension, 
and that therefore the period of suspension shall expire 120 days 
after March 11, 1992, which is July 9, 1992; and that therefore 
on and after July 10, 1992, Petitioner shall be entitled to apply 
for reinstatement and obtain reinstatement of his driving 
privileges, should he otherwise so qualify. 
DATED this 3> day of . 1992. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT: 
S 
DON V. 'TIBBS 
District Court Judge 
^^y^ 
- ? 
R. SCARTH 
Petitioner Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AFFIRMING SUSPENSION OF 
PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES FOR A PERIOD OF 120 DAYS to the 
following this ^ T ^ day of^Aj 1 w T ^ , 1992: 
J. R. SCARTH, Pro Se Pet 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
IP"-
itixioner 
